In this paper, a newly emerging duopoly market with a short life cycle is analyzed. The partially known information of market is characterized by the possibility distribution of the parameter in the demand function. Since the life cycle of the new product is short, how many products should be produced by two rival firms is a typical one-shot decision problem. Within the one-shot decision framework, the possibilistic Cournot equilibrium is obtained for the optimal production level of each firm in a duopoly market with asymmetrical possibilistic information. The analysis results show that the proposed approaches are reasonable for one-shot decision problems, which are extensively encountered in business and economics.
Introduction
Decision analysis is choosing among alternatives considering information about the states of nature, which are the factors beyond the control of a decision maker. As a limiting case, a decision maker may know which state of nature will occur. In such a case (known as decision making under certainty), it is easy to make a choice because the outcome of each alternative is deterministic. Otherwise, a decision maker acts under non-certainty. Non-certainty is divided into three categories -risk, uncertainty, and ignorance. Situations involving risk are when the probabilities of all possible outcomes can be exactly calculated. On the other hand, uncertain situations are associated with partially known information when probabilities cannot be obtained exactly [21] . Situations involving ignorance occur when no information is available to distinguish which state of nature is more likely to occur.
Decision rules for situations involving ignorance include maximin, maximax, minmax regret and Hurwicz criterion. Leading theories of decision include the expected utility (EU) theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern and the subjective expected utility (SEU) theory of Savage. EU is used in decision-making under risk whereas SEU deals with decision-making under uncertainty. Subjective probabilities are used to reflect a decision-maker's belief, traditionally analyzed in terms of betting behavior. The SEU axioms show the conditions under which preferences can be represented by a numerical expected utility that uses subjective probabilities of the states of nature to weight consequence utilities.
Research has shown that SEU does not provide an adequate description of individual choice under uncertainty [1, 5] . Alternative models such as regret theory [2, 23] , second-order probabilities [15, 26] , and non-additive probability models [6, 25] have been proposed in this empirical challenge. Prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky [16] is a noble non-additive probability model. Under prospect theory, value is assigned to gains and losses based on reference point rather than to final assets as in EU and SEU. Also probabilities are replaced by decision weights without additivity. Value functions are normally concave for gains (implying risk aversion), and convex for losses (risk seeking).
Possibility theory, initiated by Zadeh [30] and advanced by Dubois, Prade and Klir [3, 20] is one of the current uncertainty theories devoted to handling of incomplete information in the real world. Possibility theory is based on two basic non-additive measures, possibility measure and necessity measure. Decision analysis under uncertainty also can be found in the literatures [7-8, 17-19, 24, 27-29] .
It is known that decision theories under uncertainty are theories of choice under uncertainty where the objects of choice are probability distributions (for EU, SEU and their varieties), prospects framed in terms of gains and losses (for prospect theory), or possibility distributions (regarded as possibilistic lotteries [4] ). In fact, for a one-shot decision problem which is for the situation that decision is experienced once only, there is one and only one chance for one state of nature coming up. Guo [9] [10] [11] initially proposed the one-shot decision approaches for such decision problems. The procedure for one-shot decision is separated into two steps. The first step involves focusing some states of nature, called focus points. Which state of nature is focused characterizes a decision maker's different attitudes about satisfaction and possibility. In the second step, alternatives are evaluated based on their focus points where the satisfaction levels provided by all alternatives are compared with each other to obtain the optimal alternative.
Within the one-shot decision framework, a duopoly market of a new product with a short life cycle is analyzed. The possibilistic Cournot equilibrium is proposed to analyze the optimal production level of each firm in a duopoly market [9] . This paper is its extension where the procedure for calculating the possibilistic Cournot equilibrium is proposed and the extension of possibilistic Cournot equilibrium with asymmetrical possibilistic information is made. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces one-shot decision framework. In Section 3, possibilistic decision models for a duopoly market are addressed where a duopoly market with asymmetrical possibilistic information is investigated. Finally, concluding remarks for this research are made in Section 4.
One-Shot Decision Framework

Possibility distribution and Satisfaction Function
In one-shot decision problems, the set of an alternative a is A . The set of a state of nature x is S . The degree to which a state of nature is to occur in the future is characterized by a possibility distribution ) (x  , as defined below. 
means that it is abnormal that x occurs. The smaller the possibility degree of x , the more surprised for the happening of x . The following example shows how to estimate the uncertain demand by the possibility distribution.
Example 1. The demand estimation of a fashion clothes.
We ask 160 young female customers whether they are satisfied with a particular type of fashion clothes. The items of questionnaire include categories such as price, style, color and comfort. The total satisfaction degree of a customer is determined by the minimum of his satisfaction levels of all categories. The numbers of the customers whose satisfaction levels are 1, 0. Denote the degree of surprise as t . It is the common sense that the more surprised, the more impossible. Thus it is reasonable to define the possibility degree as t  1 . If we set t as 1, 0.25, 0 for the situations of "very surprised", "a litter bit surprised", "not surprised", respectively, then the possibility degrees of demands of 50, 90(=50+40), 120(=50+40+30), 140(=50+40+30+20), 150(=50+40+30+20+10) are 0, 0.75, 1, 0.75, 0, respectively. □ From the above example, it is clear that the possibility distribution can be used to represent the knowledge or judgment of human being. In the literature [12] , the upper and lower exponential possibility distributions are obtained by possibilistic linear programming problems to reflect the feasible region of decision variables. In the literatures [13] [14] , the upper and lower exponential possibility distributions are identified from the given possibility degrees of samples by experts via linear programming problems and the identified possibility distributions of the securities' returns are used for portfolio selection problems.
The  when only one decision chance is given. Since one and only one state of nature will occur for one-shot decision, the decision maker should first consider which state of nature should be focused for making a decision. The focused states of nature are called focus points. The procedure for choosing focus points is introduced in the following subsection.
Determining Focus Points of Alternatives
Let us begin with the following definition which is used for determining focus points. 
It follows from (8) 
In consideration of (5),
; that is, for a state of nature x , both of the possibility degree and the satisfaction level provided by an alternative a are at least
increase the lower bounds of the possibility degree and the satisfaction level simultaneously. 
It follows from (9) that ) 
Obtaining the Optimal Alternative
Based on the obtained different types of focus points, the optimal alternatives are determined as follows: (10), (11) and (12) for the cases that multiple focus points exist for an alternative. maximin and maximax reflect the conservative and aggressive attitude, respectively.
A decision maker is called a normal decision maker or an active decision maker or a passive decision maker if he takes into account the normal focus points or active focus points or passive focus points for making one-shot decisions. We can image three types of decision makers as follows: when making a one-shot decision the normal decision maker focuses on the most possible outcome; the active decision maker takes into account the scenario which can yield the higher satisfaction with a higher possibility; the passive decision maker considers the scenario which can lead to the lower satisfaction with a higher possibility. Theorem 1 [9] . 
Assume that (I) Possibility distribution is a unimodal continuous function which satisfies
where  
Duopoly Market Analysis with Possibilistic Information
The Basic of Cournot Equilibrium
We image an industry with two firms, 1 and 2 (duopoly market), each producing and selling single goods. Consumers do not care from which firm they purchase the goods. The following well-used linear inverse demand function in economics is considered [22] : (15) showing the price decrease when the total supply increasing by one unit.
Here we consider that each firm has Cournot conjecture about its rival: Each of two firms assumes that the other firm will act in a way to keep fixed the production level. With Cournot conjecture, the profit of each firm i (i=1, 2) is as follows: 16) where the production cost is ignored for simplicity.
Conjecturing that Firm j has the production level j q , the sufficient and necessary condition for maximizing (16) is as follows:
which is obtained by differentiating (16) 
Two firms are at equilibrium in this industry when neither firm wants to change what it is doing, given that the rival keeps the same production level. So that this 
which leads to
where  i q is called the equilibrium production level of Firm i.
Cournot Equilibrium with Possibilistic Information
Let us consider a newly emerging duopoly market with a short life cycle. It is reasonable to think that there is only one chance for these two firms to decide how many products they should produce due to a short life cycle. (18), the following conclusions can be obtained [9] . 
Cournot Equilibrium with Asymmetrical Possibilistic Information
Let us consider an asymmetrical information case. That is, some new information s on c is known by Firm 2 but not by Firm 1. In this case, the production level of , is defined as follows: 
